Posts Tagged ‘Intangible economic value’

The Digital Age Gave Rise to New Definitions – New Benchmarks were born on the World Wide Web for the Intangible Asset of Firm’s Reputation: Pay a Premium for buying e-Reputation

Curator: Aviva Lev–Ari, PhD, RN

UPDATED on 4/4/2022

Analytics for e-Reputation based on LinkedIn 1st Degree Connections, +7,500 of LPBI Group’s Founder, 2012-2022: An Intangible Asset – Connections’ Position Seniority & Biotech / Pharma Focus

Author: Aviva Lev-Ari, PhD, RN, Founder of 1.0 LPBI, 2012-2020 & 2.0 LPBI, 2021-2025 and Data Scientist, Research Assistant III: Tianzuo George Li



UPDATED on 7/30/2021

Analysis of a corporate Stream of Innovation as reputation builder for venture valuation is presented, below

2.0 LPBI is a Very Unique Organization

Author: Aviva Lev-Ari, PhD, RN, Founder of 1.0 LPBI and 2.0 LPBI, April 2012 to Present


Direct reputation, feedback reputation and signaling effects are present; and shows that better sellers are always more likely to brand stretch. The comparative statics with respect to the initial reputation level, however, are not obvious. … a higher reputation firm can earn a higher direct reputation effect premium. But a higher reputation firm also has more to lose. The trade-off between using one’s reputation and protecting it can go both ways.

Luıs M B Cabral, New York University and CEPR, 2005

Part 1:   A Digital Business Defined and the Intangible Asset of Firm’s Reputation

  1.  Claiming Distinction
  2.  Recognition Bestowed
  3.  The Technology
  4.  The Sphere of Influence
  5.  The Industrial Benefactors in Potential
  6.  The Actors at Play – Experts, Authors, Writers – Life Sciences & Medicine as it applies to HEALTH CARE
  7.  1st Level Connection on LinkedIn = +7,100 and Endorsements = +1,500
  8.  The DIGITAL REPUTATION of our Venture – Twitter for the Professional and for Institutions
  9.  Growth in Twitter Followers and in Global Reach: Who are the NEW Followers? they are OUR COMPETITION   and   other Media Establishments – that is the definition of Trend Setter, Opinion Leader and Source for Emulation
  10.  Business Aspects of the Brick & Mortar World render OBSOLETE

Part 2:   Business Perspectives on Reputation

Part 3:   Economics Perspectives on Reputation

Part 1:   A Digital Business Defined and the Intangible Asset of Firm’s Reputation

This curation attempts to teach-by-example the new reality of the Intangible Asset of Firm’s Reputation when the business is 100% in the cloud, 100% electronic in nature (paperless), the customers are the Global Universe and the organization is 100% Global and 100% virtual.

A Case in Point: Intellectual Property Production Process of Health Care Digital Content using electronic Media Channels

Optimal Testimonial of e-Product Quality and Reputation for an Open Access Online Scientific Journal pharmaceuticalintelligence.com 

 1.   Claiming Distinction

Executive Summary

WHAT ARE LPBI Group’s NEEDS in June 2019: Aviva’s BOLD VISION on June 11, 2019

2.   Recognition Bestowed 

Our Books are here

  • On 8/17/2018, Dr. Lev-Ari, PhD, RN was contacted by the President elect of the Massachusetts Academy of Sciences (MAS), Prof. Katya Ravid of Boston University, School of Medicine, to join MAS in the role of Liaison to the Biotechnology and eScientific Publishing industries for the term of August 2018-July 2021. In the MAS, Dr. Lev-Ari serve as Board member, Fellow, and Advisor to the Governing Board.







Sixteen Volumes ARE ON AMAZON.COM, average book length – 2,400 pages


3.   The Technology

Curation Methodology – Digital Communication Technology to mitigate Published Information Explosion and Obsolescence in Medicine and Life Sciences

Detailed Technology Description

LPBI’s Pipeline Map: A Positioning Perspectives – An Outlook to the Future from the Present

4.   The Sphere of Influence 

LPBI Group’s Social Media Presence

JOURNAL Statistics on 2/24/2019

  • LPBI Platform is been used by GLOBAL Communities of Scientists for interactive dialogue of SCIENCE – Four case studies are presented in the link, below

Electronic Scientific AGORA: Comment Exchanges by Global Scientists on Articles published in the Open Access Journal @pharmaceuticalintelligence.com – Four Case Studies

Curator and Editor-in-Chief: Journal and BioMed e-Series, Aviva Lev-Ari, PhD, RN


5.   The Industrial Benefactors in Potential

Opportunities Map in the Acquisition Arena

Dynamic Contents for LPBI Group’s PowerPoint Presentation

Potential Use of LPBI IP as Value Price Driver by Potential Acquirer: Assumptions per Asset Class 

6.   The Actors at Play – Experts, Authors, Writers – Life Sciences & Medicine as it applies to HEALTH CARE

Founder’s Role in the Development of Venture’s Factors of Content Production – Biographical Notes by Aviva Lev-Ari, PhD, RN, LPBI Group

Top Authors by Number of eReaders Views

Top Articles by Number of e-Readers for All Days ending 2019-02-17

FIT Members Contribute to Opportunities Map

FINAL IMPROVEMENT TEAM (FIT): Definition of Active, Lapsing of Active Status, COMPs Formulas

FIT members – Who works on WHAT?

Summer 2019 Plan – Research Associates Tasks

7.   1st Level Connection on LinkedIn = +7,100 and Endorsements = +1,500

Connections First Level on LinkedIn: 500 CEOs, 200 Big Pharma Professionals, 7,000 in Total: LPBI Group Founder – Aviva Lev-Ari, PhD, RN

8.   The DIGITAL REPUTATION of our Venture – Twitter for the Professional and for Institutions

Mostly HONORED to be followed by [from an Excerpt of 117 Followers of the Twitter Account @AVIVA1950 from the List of 359 Followers] by the Number of their Followers on 2/24/2019

LPBI Group is mostly HONORED to be followed by [from an Excerpt of 136 Followers of the Twitter Account @pharma_BI from the List of 505 Followers] by the Number of their Followers on 3/20/2019

Excerpt of 136 Followers of @pharma_BI (from the List of 505 Followers) by the Number of their Followers on 3/20/2019

Excerpt of 117 Followers of @AVIVA1950 (from the List of 359 Followers) by the Number of their Followers

REACH – Two Handles on Twitter.com @AVIVA1950 @pharma_BI

9.   Growth in Twitter Followers and in Global Reach: Who are the NEW Followers: OUR COMPETITION and other Media Establishments – that is the definition of Trend Setter, Opinion Leader and Source for Emulation

@4openjournalFollows you


4open is a multi- & inter-disciplinary, online, peer-reviewed, open access journal publishing across a broad range of subjects in the STEM domain.

@roll_clausFollows you


Publishing Editor at 


@PubtextoPFollows you


Pubtexto is an International online publishing organization that publishes Scientific literature through its different open access Journals.

@alexanderlabrieFollows you




@BjoernBruecherFollows you



(link: http://linkedin.com/in/bruecher)

linkedin.com/in/bruecher // 

(link: http://4open-sciences.org)

4open-sciences.org – Editor-in-Chief // Science Profile – 

(link: http://researchgate.net/profile/Bjoern)


@MPDexpertFollows you


translate research into life-changing Global manufactured Medical Products – drugs, devices, biotech, combination; anything requiring FDA approval#MedProdDev

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Life science expert & investor_travel, wine & golf amateur_Proud father of 2 girls_My Tweets are only mine 

@INmuneBioFollows you


INmune Bio, Inc. is developing therapies that harness patient’s #immunesystem to treat #cancer. Our focus is on #NKcells and #myeloid derived suppressor cells.

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Innovating #tech #education #business CEO CTO Advisor & Prof. #blockchain #AI 



 #FinTech #speaker #SDGs #STEM #techforgood #sustainability

@sciencetracker2Follows you

You will hear more recent and cool scientific news here. Besides, some health and tech news. Follow us in

(link: http://facebook.com/sciencetracker2)


13.8K Following


Followed by Stanford Tweets, Biotech Week Boston, and 23 others you follow

@sgruenwaldFollows you


MD, PhD, scientist, futurist, entrepreneur, managing director of 

(link: http://www.genautica.com)

genautica.com, co-founder 

(link: http://www.diagnomics.com)


(link: http://www.scoop.it/t/amazing-science)


10.  Business Aspects of the Brick & Mortar World render OBSOLETE

Financial Valuation of Three Health Care Intellectual Property (IP) Content Asset Classes

Global Market Penetration Forecast for each Volume in the 16 Volume BioMed e-Series

2013-2019, On the Medical & Scientific Bookshelf in Kindle Store: eReader Behaviors: Browsing, Page Downloads and Buying e-Books – LPBI Group’s BioMed e-Series, Royalties Payment Analysis 


Warren Buffett on reputation: the economic value of values, integrity and corporate culture

Warren Buffett understands that reputation and integrity have economic value. Research that shows that a good reputation is worth real money — in fact, some research indicates that a good reputation might replace a line of credit at the bank. In his book Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values, Lawrence Cunningham argues that one of Berkshire Hathaway’s greatest assets is reputation.


The Value of Reputation

Thomas Pfeiffer1,2,4,*, Lily Tran5, Coco Krumme5 and David G Rand1,3,* 1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, FAS, 2 School of Applied Sciences and Engineering, and 3 Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA 4 New Zealand Institute for Advanced Study, Massey University, Auckland 0745, New Zealand 5 MIT Media Laboratory, Cambridge MA 02139, USA

Reputation plays a central role in human societies.

Empirical and theoretical work indicates that a good reputation is valuable in that it increases one’s expected payoff in the future. Here, we explore a game that couples a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), in which participants can earn and can benefit from a good reputation, with a market in which reputation can be bought and sold. This game allows us to investigate how the trading of reputation affects cooperation in the PD, and how participants assess the value of having a good reputation. We find that depending on how the game is set up, trading can have a positive or a negative effect on the overall frequency of cooperation. Moreover, we show that the more valuable a good reputation is in the PD, the higher the price at which it is traded in the market. Our findings have important implications for the use of reputation systems in practice.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; reciprocal altruism; indirect reciprocity; reputation


The Impact of Reputation on Market Value by Simon Cole

One of the most familiar, but least understood, intangible assets is a firm’s reputation.

Simon Cole is the founding partner of the corporate reputation and branding consultancy Reputation Dividend (www. reputationdividend.com).


Part 3:   ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES on Reputation

The Economics of Trust and Reputation: A Primer

Luıs M B Cabral New York University and CEPR, June 2005, lecture series at the University of Zurich



Notes on the literature

Important note: The notes in this section are essentially limited to the ideas discussed in the present version of these lectures notes. They cannot therefore be considered a survey of the literature. There are dozens of articles on the economics of reputation which I do not include here. In a future version of the text, I hope to provide a more complete set of notes on the literature. The notes below follow the order with which topics are presented.

Bootstrap models. The bootstrap mechanism for trust is based on a general result known as the folk theorem (known as such because of its uncertain origins). For a fairly general statement of the theorem (and its proof) see Fudenberg and Makin (1986). One of the main areas of application of the folk theorem has been the problem of (tacit or explicit) collusion in oligopoly. This is a typical problem of trust (or lack thereof): all firms would prefer prices to be high and output to be low; but each firm, individually, has an incentive to drop price and increase output. Friedman (1971) presents one of the earliest formal applications of the folk theorem to oligopoly collusion. He considers the case when firms set prices and history is perfectly observable. Both of the extensions presented in Section 2.2 were first developed with oligopoly collusion applications in mind. The case of trust with noisy signals (2.2.1) was first developed by Green and Porter (1984). A long series of papers have been written on this topic, including the influential work by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) proposed a model of oligopoly collusion with fluctuating market demand. In this case, the intuition presented in Section 2.2.2 implies that firms collude on a lower price during periods of higher demand. This suggests that prices are counter-cyclical in markets where firms collude. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) present supporting evidence from the cement industry. A number of papers have built on Rotemberg and Saloner’s analysis. Kandori (1992) shows that the i.i.d. assumption simplifies the analysis but is not crucial. Harrington (19??) considers a richer demand model and looks at how prices vary along the business cycle. The basic idea of repetition as a form of ensuring seller trustworthiness is developed in Klein and Leffler (1981). See also Telser (1980) and Shapiro (1983). When considering the problem of free entry, Klein and Leffler (1981) propose advertising as a solution, whereas Shapiro (1983) suggests low intro25 ductory prices. Section ?? is based on my own research notes. The general analysis of selfreinforcing agreements when there is an outside option of the kind considered here may be found in Ray (2002). Watson (1999, 2002) also considers models where the level of trust stars at a low level and gradually increases.

Bayesian models. The seminal contributions to the study of Bayesian models of reputation are Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). The model in Section 3.2.1 includes elements from these papers as well as from Diamond (1989). H¨olmstrom (1982/1999) makes the point that separation leads to reduced incentives to invest in reputation. The issue of reputation with separation and changing types is treated in detail in the forthcoming book by Mailath and Samuelson (2006). In Section 3.3, I presented a series of models that deal with name as carriers of reputations. The part on changing names (Section 3.3.1) reflects elements from a variety of models, though, to the best of my knowledge, no study exists that models the process of secret, costless name changes in an infinite period adverse selection context. The study of markets for names follows the work by Tadelis (1999) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001). All of these papers are based on the Bayesian updating paradigm. Kreps (1990) presents an argument for trading reputations in a bootstrap type of model. The analysis of brand stretching (Section 3.3.3) is adapted from Cabral (2000). The paper considers a more general framework where the direct reputation, feedback reputation and signalling effects are present; and shows that better sellers are always more likely to brand stretch. The comparative statics with respect to the initial reputation level, however, are not obvious. As we saw above, a higher reputation firm can earn a higher direct reputation effect premium. But a higher reputation firm also has more to lose. The trade-off between using one’s reputation and protecting it can go both ways. For other papers on brand stretching and umbrella branding see Choi (1998), Anderson (2002).


Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica 58, 1041–1064. Andersson, Fredrik (2002), “Pooling reputations,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 715–730. Bernhein, B. Douglas and Michael D. Whinston (1990), “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior,” Rand Journal of Economics 21, 1–26. Cabral, Lu´ıs M B (2000), “Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation,” Rand Journal of Economics 31, 658-673. Choi, J.P. (1998), “Brand Extension and Informational Leverage,” Review of Economic Studies 65, 655–69. Diamond, Douglas W (1989), “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 97, 828–862. Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Valim ¨ aki ¨ (2003), “Bad Reputation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 785–814. Fishman, A., and R. Rob (2005), “Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion through Word of Mouth Reputation,” forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy. Friedman, James (1971), “A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames,” Review of Economic Studies 28, 1–12. Fudenberg, Drew and Eric Maskin (1986), “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Imperfect Public Information,” Econometrica 54, 533–556. Green, Ed and Robert Porter (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,” Econometrica 52, 87–100. Holmstrom, Bengt ¨ (1999), “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. (Originally (1982) in Essays in Honor of Professor Lars Wahlback.) Kandori, Michihiro (1992), “Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players,” Review of Economic Studies 59, 81–92. Klein, B, and K Leffler (1981), “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance,” Journal of Political Economy 89, 615–641. 27 Kreps, David (1990), “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in J Alt and K Shepsle (Eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90–143. Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245–252. Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253–279. Mailath, George J, and Larry Samuelson (2001), “Who Wants a Good Reputation?,” Review of Economic Studies 68, 415–441. Mailath, George J, and Larry Samuelson (1998), “Your Reputation Is Who You’re Not, Not Who You’d Like To Be,” University of Pennsylvania and University of Wisconsin. Mailath, George J, and Larry Samuelson (2006), Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts (1982), “Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence,” Journal of Economic Theory 27, 280–312. Phelan, Christopher (2001), “Public Trust and Government Betrayal,” forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory. Ray, Debraj (2002), “The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements,” Econometrica 70, 547–582. Rotemberg, Julio, and Garth Saloner (1986), “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms,” American Economic Review 76, 390–407. Shapiro, Carl (1983), “Premiums for High Quality Products as Rents to Reputation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659–680. Tadelis, S. (1999), “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset,” American Economic Review 89, 548–563. Tadelis, Steven (2002), “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism,” Journal of Political Economy 92, 854–882. Telser, L G (1980), “A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements,” Journal of Business 53, 27–44. Tirole, Jean (1996), “A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality),” Review of Economic Studies 63, 1–22. 28 Watson, Joel (1999), “Starting Small and Renegotiation,” Journal of Economic Theory 85, 52–90. Watson, Joel (2002), “Starting Small and Commitment,” Games and Economic Behavior 38, 176–199. Wernerfelt, Birger (1988), “Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond,” Rand Journal of Economics 19, 458–466.


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